Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2016

Terry R. Spencer, Et Al., Plaintiffs/Appellants vs. Stephen M.
Glover, Et Al., Defendants/Appellees
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Spencer et al v Glover, No. 20150892 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2016).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3441

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
---0000000---

TERR Y R. SPENCER, et al. ,

)
)
)

)

Pl aintiffa/Appel lants,

) Appellate Case No . 201 50892-CA
)

)
)

V.

STEPHEN M GLOVER,
Defendant/Appel lee.

)
)

)
)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Appeal from Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Spencer, et al., v. Glover, Case No.
150903279, Honorable L. Douglas Hogan, Presiding

ROBERT B. CUMMINGS (SBN 13 186)
THE SALT LAKE LA WYER S
10 Exchange Place, Suite 622
Salt Lake City, UT 84 11 1
Telephone: (801 ) 590- 7555
Facsimile: (801) 384-0825
E-mail: rol5crt@thesalt!akela1vyc1·s.com

Allorneys for Defendant/Appellee
GA VIN D . COLLIER
TERRY R . SPENCER, Ph.D.
TR Spencer & Associates, P .C.
140 West 9000 South, Suite 9
Sandy, Utah 84070

FILED

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUN~ 8 2016

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
---0000000---

TERRY R. SPENCER, et al.,

)
)

)
)
) Appellate Case No. 20150892-CA

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

)
V.

STEPHEN M. GLOVER,
Defendant/ Appel lee.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~--------.

·---- - · - - - - - - - - - - -

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Appeal from Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Spencer, et al., v. Glover, Case No.
150903279, Honorable L. Douglas Hogan, Presiding

ROBERT B. CUMMINGS (SBN 13186)
THE SALT LAKE LA WYERS
10 Exchange Place, Suite 622

Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 590-7555
Facsimile: (80 l) 384-0825

E-mail: robcrl(aHhesa It lukclmvycrs.com
Attorneys.for Defendant/Appellee

GA VIN G. COLLIER
TERRY R. SPENCER, Ph.D.
TR Spencer & Associates, P. C.
140 Wesl 9000 South, Suite 9
Sandy, Utah 84070
Attorneys for Plaint(DlAppella11t

DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
Pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(l), the Plaintiffs/Appel1ants to this appeal are
Terry R. Spencer and TR Spencer & Associates, P.C. Defendant/Appellee is Stephen M.

Glover.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION

DESIGNATION OF PARTIES

PAGE
n/a

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

111

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES,
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
OF Tl IIS APPEAL

6

ST ATEMENT OF CASE

6

STATEMENT OF FACTS

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

14

ARGUMENT

15

I.

General Law Applicable To Defamation And The First Amendment

15

II.

Judge Hogan Was Correct In Finding The Yelp.com Review Is Mere
Opinion And Not Defamatory

16

A. The Common Usage Of The Words In The Yelp.com Review Is
To Express Opinion

18

B. The Potentially Objectionable Statements Are Not Capable Of
Being Objectively Verified

20

C. The Full Yelp.com Review Shows That It Was Mere Opinion

22

D. The Broader Setting Of The Review Published On Yelp.com

24

Shows The Comment Is Mere Opinion
Ill.

The Intentional Infliclion or Emotional Distress Claim Fails
Because The Yelp.com Review Was Not Defamatory And

26

Otherwise Does Not Rise To The Level Of Extreme Or Outrageous
Conduct
IV.

The Intentional Interference With Economic Relations Claim Fails

27

Because Mr. Glover's Yelp.com Review Does Not Amount To
Improper Means
V.

Judge Hogan Properly Treated Mr. Glover's Motion As A Motion

28

To Dismiss
VI.

Request To Seal Portions Of Record On Appeal

30

CONCLUSION

31

UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(l l) STATEMENT

32

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO UTAH R. APP. P.
24(f)( 1)(A)

32

ADDENDUM

nk

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, 194 P.3d 903
Alvarado v. KOBTV, LLC, 493 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2007)
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & lvfcDonough, 2003 UT 9, 70 P.3d 17
Brumpton Bldg, LLC, 2013 IL App ( JS') 12054 7-U, 2013 WL 416185 (Ill.
App. Ct. Jan. 31, 2013)
Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988)
Cuny v. Yelp inc., Case No. 14-cv-03547-JST, 2015 WL 1849037 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 21, 2015)
Dahl v. Harrison, 2011 UT App 3 89, 265 P.3d 139
Dennet v. Smith, 445 P.2d 983 (Utah 1968)
Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, 345 P .3d 553
GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F .3d 1381 ( I 0th Cir.
1997)
Hogan v. Winder, No. 2: 12-cv-123 TS, 2012 WL 4356326 (D. Utah Sept.
24, 2012), aff'd, 762 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2014)
Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2014)
Loftus v. Nazari, 21 F.Supp.3d 849 (E.D. Ky. 2014)
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. I ( 1990)
Oakwood Village. LLC v. A lbertsons, Inc., 2004 UT IO 1, I04 P .3d 1226

5,28
30
3-4, 27

19, 23
3
10

30
15, 17
27
30
Passim

13
25,27
16
4-5, 28-

29, 30
Seal v. Young, No. 2: 10-cv-790 TS, 2012 WL 177544 (D. Utah Jan. 20,
2012)
Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC, 728 F.3d 592 (6 th Cir. 2013)

21

Simler v. Chile/, 2016 UT 23, -- P.3d --, 2016 WL 3101845
St. Benedict's Devel. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 81 I P.2d 194 (Utah 1991)
Webster v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 2012 UT App 321, 290 P .3d 930
West v. Thomson New,\papers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994)
Westmont Maintenance Co,p. v. Vance, 2013 UT App 236,313 P.3d 1149

15-16,
20,22
3
4
2
Passim
2,3,4

RULES AND STATUTES

PAGE

R. APP. P. 3
R. APP. P. 21
UTAH R. APP. P. 24
UTAH

31
31

UTAH

111

UTAJT R. Clv. P. I 2(b)

4, 6, 11,
30

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3- I 02

UT AH CODE ANN.

I
.I
11

§ 78A-4- l 03

UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-11-108
UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. R. 4-202.02

~

31
21

UTAH. R. PROF'L C. 1.16

~

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

PAGE

Utah Const. art. I, § l
Utah Const. art. I, § 15
United States Const. amendment I

6

6
6

OTHER SOURCES

PAGE

The Advocate, Official Publication of the Idaho State Bar, Vo. 52 No. 1,
Jan. 2009 (available at
http://isb. idaho. gov/pd f/advocatc/issucs/adv09jan.pd f

iv

21

STATEMENT OF .JURISDICTION

On September 28, 2015, Judge Hogan entered a ruling and order dismissing all of
Plaintiffs/Appellants Terry R. Spencer and TR Spencer and Associates, P.C. 's
(collectively, "Spencer") claims and ordered the parties to arbitrate Spencer's breach of
contract claim. (R004 I 7-00426.) As to the latter, Judge Hogan dismissed the breach of
contract claim without prejudice. (R00426.) Therefore, Judge Hogan's order resolved all
of Spencer's claims and is thus a final order appealablc pursuant to UTAH R.

Arr. P. 3(a).

Original appellate jurisdiction vested with the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to UTAH
CODE ANN.

*78A-3-l 02(3)(j).

(See R00448-00449.) On October 28, 2015, the Utah

Supreme Court, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78/\-3-102( 4 ), transferred jurisdiction
over this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. (R0045 l-00452.) 1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(5)(A) and (b)( 1), Mr. Glover herein
incorporates Spencer's citations to where the issues below were preserved in the record in
the trial court, unless othe1wise noted. (App. Br. at l-3.) Spencer provided three issues

1

Spencer cites UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(h) as the conferring statute vesting this

Court with original appellate jurisdiction. That code section, however, only applies to
"appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases~ including, but not limited
to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visilalion,
adoption, and paternity[.]"

on appeal, but Mr. Glover disputes Spencer's characterization of the issues. Furthermore,
while Spencer docs not raise on appeal Judge Hogan's decision to not consider the
affidavits submitted by Spencer in support of their opposition to Mr. Glover's Motion to
Dismiss, Spencer has referenced Judge Hogan's decision on that issue. Therefore, while
Mr. Glover reserves the right to assert that Spencer has not properly preserved the issue
for appeal by not clearly raising it in their opening brief, Mr. Glover is addressing the
issue out of an abundance of caution.
ISSUE #1: Did Judge Hogan err in granting Mr. Glover's Motion to Dismiss

Spencer's defamation claim finding that the comment was protectable opinion based
upon: (i) the objectionable words, including "hunt-and-peck", "b.s.", "yelled', and
"worst ever" in the Yelp.com review conveying subjeclive beliefs; (ii) these phrases
conveying subjective belief thereby making it not possible to objectively verify whether
the statements arc true or false; (iii) the context of the Yclp.com review showing that the
statements were made by a biased, and therefore potentially unreliable, individual; and
(iv) the context of the review, being on Yelp.com, suggesting that the statements in the
comment arc opinion?
STANDARD OF REVIE\V: The Utah Court of Appeals "review[s] a district

court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for correctness." Westmont Nfaintenance Corp. v.
Vance, 2013 UT App 236, ii I 0, 313 P.3d 1149 (citing Webster v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank, NA, 2012 UT App 321, ii 2,290 P.3d 930) (reviewing grant of motion to dismiss

2

defamation claim on judicial proceedings privilege grounds). "When reviewing the
propriety of granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, [the Court of Appeals] accept[s] as true all material allegations contained
in the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." West v. Thomson
Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1003 (Utah I 994) (cilations omitted) (applying standard to

defamation claim on motion to dismiss). Furthermore, "' [w ]hether a statement is capable
of sustaining a defamatory meaning is a question

or law.'"

Id. at I 008. '"Only if a court

first determines that a publication might be considered defamatory by a reasonable person
is there a fact issue for the trier of fact." Cox v. Hatch, 76 l P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988).
Like this Court's review of a motion to dismiss, this Court reviews questions oflaw for

correctness. Simler v. Chile/, 2016 UT 23, ii 9, -- P.3d--, 2016 WL 3101845 (citations
omitted).

ISSUE #2: Did Judge Hogan err in dismissing Spencer's intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim finding that the online Y clp.com review was neither defamatory
nor did it amount to outrageous or intolerable behavior, and Spencer pled no other facts
to suggest objectionable behavior by Mr. Glover?
STANDARD OF REVIE\V: The Utah Court of Appeals reviews the grant of a

motion to dismiss for correctness, accepting as true all material allegations contained in
the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Vance, 2013 UT App 236,

ii l O;

West, 872 P.2d at l 003. See also Bennett v. .Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &

3

McDonough, 2003 UT 9, 158, 70 P.3d 17 (setting forth standard to state a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress).
ISSUE #3: Did Judge Hogan err in dismissing Spencer's claim for intentional

inference with economic relations based upon Spencer's failure to plead facts supporting
that Mr. Glover's conduct amounted

to

"improper means," especially considering that the

Yelp.com review is protcctable opinion and not defamatory?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Utah Court of Appeals reviews the grant of a

motion to dismiss for correctness, accepting as true all material allegations contained in
the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Vance, 2013 UT App 236,

1 )0;

West, 872 P.2d at I 003. See also St. Benedict's Devel. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.,

8 J I P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991) (setting forth standard to state a claim for intentional

interference with economic relations).
ISSUE #4: Did Judge Hogan err in not considering the affidavits submitted by

Spencer, the submission of which was in violation of UTAH R. crv. P. 12(6), and
otherwise not converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to UT AHR. Crv. P. 12(b )?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "If a court does not exclude material outside the

pleadings and fails to convert a rule 12(6)(6) motion to one for summary judgment, it is
reversible error unless the dismissal can be justified without considering the outside
documents." Oakwood Village, LLC v. A lhertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ii 12, I 04 P .3d

4

1226 (citation omitted). There are two exceptions, however. "First, if ·a plaintiff docs
not incorporate by reference or attach a document to its complaint, but the document is
referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff's claim, a defendant may submit
an indisputably authentic copy to the court to be considered on a motion to dismiss."' Id.
at 1 13 (citalion omitted). Second, "the submission of documents outside the pleadings
by itscl f is not a basis for conversion to summary judgment; to effect a rule I 2(b)
conversion, the court must have relied on those documents for its decision." Id. at ii 14
(citation omitted). 2
PRESERVED IN THE RECORD BELOW: The issue as to whether Judge

Hogan should convert Mr. Glover's Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment was raised at R00342-00343, and refuted by Mr. Glover at R00395, R0039900400. Spencer, however, did not directly raise the issue in their opening brief.
Therefore, the issue should not be addressed by this Court. See, e.g., Alle,t v. Friel, 2008
UT 56, ~I 8, 194 P.3d 903 ("It is well settled that 'issues raised by an appellant in the
reply brief that were not presented in the opening brief arc considered waived and will
not be considered by the appellate court."' (citation omitted)).
2

Spencer did not raise this as an issue in the opening brief. Spencer, hO\vever, referenced

Judge Hogan's decision to not review the affidavits submitted by Spencer in suppoti of
Spencer's Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, Mr. Glover has addressed
that issue here, although not necessarily properly raised or preserved by Spencer.
5

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES,
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF
THIS APPEAL

Mr. Glover believes that only the proper application of UTAH R. CIV. P. l 2(b) in
relation to Spencer's dismissed claims is at issue and determinative of this appeal.
Additionally, however, United States Constitution, amendment I and Utah State
Constitution, article I, sections 1 and 15 are at play regarding the protections provided by
those constitutional provisions to opinion as protectable speech.
ST ATEMENT OF CASE

This case involves an attorney attempting to strong-arm his former client into
removing an unflattering review from Y clp.com. Spencer, an attorney and his law firm
in Salt Lake, Utah, sued his former client, Mr. Glover, based upon a review that Mr.
Glover posted on Yelp.com. The comment in total read:
Worst ever. Had to fire him after I gave him a cluzncefor well over a year.
Paid him his $2,500 retainer, then paid him another $2,500 shortly
after ... and I still owe him another several thousand dollars! ... all for his
hunt-and-peck filing typing b.s. while he makes me ·watch. I'd be willing to
wager that he was sitting on it and running the hill up until I produced money
that she [the petitioner in the divorce case} had not gotten her hands on. She
admitted that she spent $40k in the safe. My order is_still_based on
substantial~v higher income earned in the hard way in the Middle East,
supporting my family by supporting those who protect our freedom. The
arrears has become astronomical and ORS is threatening lo take my license
and passport ... Yelled at me once when I called to ask him about something
his o,fJice had sent me that day. Told me to "GOOGLE JT!" Worst. Ever.
Filed a Utah Bar complaint strongly considering suing him. Just have to
find someone to do it.

Based upon this on line Yelp.com review, Spencer sued Mr. Glover for, relevant to

6

this appeal, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional
interference with economic relations. The Honorable L. Douglas Hogan presided below.
After filing the complaint, Spencer also sought a Temporary Restraining Order seeking
immediate judicial intervention to force Mr. Glover remove the review on an expedited
basis, which Judge Hogan denied. Mr. Glover then moved to dismiss the claims at issue,
pursuant to UTAH R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 3

Jn a well-reasoned, thorough opinion, Judge Hogan applied the four factors from
Hogan v. Winder, No. 2: I 2-cv-123 TS, 20 I 2 WL 4356326 (D. Utah Sept. 24, 2012),
a.ff'd, 762 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing West, 872 P.2d at 1018) in determining that

Mr. Glover's Yelp.com review was opinion and did not amount to defamation. As
Spencer's other tort-based causes of action hinged upon the Yelp.com review being
defamatory, Judge Hogan dismissed those claims as well with prejudice. 4
3

As discussed below, Spencer also sued Mr. Glover for breach of contract and

declaratory relief. Judge Hogan dismissed the declaratory relief claim, and Spencer has
not appealed that determination. Judge Hogan dismissed the breach of contract claim
without prejudice and ordered the parties to arbitration based upon the engagement letter
provided to Mr. Glover by Spencer. Spencer has not appealed Judge Hogan's order as to
the breach of contract c1aim either.
4

Spencer did not request leave to amend in the court below, and Spencer has not raised

the issue of leave to amend on appeal.

7

On appeal, Spencer claims that the following phrases are defamatory: "Worst
ever"; "had to fire him"; "all for his hunt-and-peck filing typing B.S. while he makes me
watch"; "I'd be willing to wager that he was sitting on it an mnning the gill up until I
produced money"; and "Yelled at me once when l called to ask him about something his
office had sent me that day. Told me to 'GOOGLE IT!' Worst. Ever." (App. Br., at 17-

19.) In support, however, Spencer does not explain how Judge Hogan's order was wrong
or inc01Tect. Rather, Spencer relies upon simply restating the Hogan factors in
conclusory terms without convincing analysis or explanation.
Judge Hogan's order was correct. The Yelp.com review is opinion, containing
Mr. Glover's subjective beliefa laced with hyperbole, and therefore does not give rise to a
defamation claim as a matter of law. Courts nationwide are in accord when facing
similar online reviews. Because Spencer's other tort-based claims rely upon the
allegedly defamatory nature of the Yelp.com review, Judge Hogan's order was correct in
dismissing those claims with prejudice as well. Indeed, Spencer does not dispute that if
their defamation claim fails as a matter of law, so must their other tort-based claims.
Respectfolly, this Court should affirm Judge Hogan's order in total.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff/Appellant Terry R. Spencer is an attorney in Utah. (App. Br. at l; see

also ROOOO 1, at 1 I.) Plaintiff/Appellant TR Spencer & Associates, P.C. is a "Utah
corporation under which Mr. Spencer performs legal services for the general public."

8

(App. Br. at 1; see also R00002, at ii 2.) Mr. Glover hired Spencer to represent him in his
divorce proceedings, Glover v. Glover, Case No. I 34402482, pending in the Fourth
Judicial District, before the Honorable Derek P. Pullan. (See R00253-00259; R0026100270.)
Over time, Mr. Glover became dissatisfied with Spencer's legal services. For
example, from March 2014 to, at a minimum, December 2014, there appears to have been
little to no communication between Spencer and Mr. Glover related to the divorce
proceedings. (See R00226 (citing R00I 9, at~~ 7-9; R00261-00270.) Therefore, on
March 18, 2015, Mr. Glover hired a new attorney. (See R0025-R0026 (citing R00258;
R00022, at ,r 25.)
On or around April 29, 2015, Mr. Glover posted a review on Yelp.com pertaining
to Spencer. (R000I 0.) That review stated:
Worst ever. Had to fire him after I gave him a chance for l-vell over a year.
Paid him his $2,500 retainer, then paid him another $2,500 shortly after ...
and I still owe him another several thousand dollars! ... all for his hunt-andpeckfiling typing b.s. while he makes me watch. I'd be willing to wager that
he was sitting on it and running the bill up until I produced money that she
[the petitioner in the divorce case} had not gotten her hands on. She
admitted that she spent $4Uk in the s{{/e. My order is_still_based on
substantially higher income earned in the hard ·way in the Middle East,
supporting my family by supporting those who protect our freedom. The
arrears has become astronomical and ORS is threatening to take my license
and passport ... Yelled at me once when I called to ask him about something
his office had sent ,ne that day. Told me to "GOOGLE IT!" Worst. Ever.
Filed a Utah Bar complaint strongly considering suing him. Just have to
find someone to do it.
(Id.) Yelp.corn "'describes itself generally as an online networking platform that

9

connects people with great local businesses, by hosting user-generated reviews."
(R00227, ,r 13 (citing Cur,y v. Yelp Inc., Case No. 14-cv-03547-JST, 2015 WL 1849037,

at *l (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2015) (citation omitted) (unpublished).)
Spencer sued Mr. Glover based upon Mr. Glover,s Yelp.com review. (R0000 100009.) In their lawsuit, Spencer sued Mr. Glover for: i) defamation; ii) intentional

infliction of emotional distress; iii) intentional interference with economic relations; iv)
declaratory relief; and v) breach of contract. (Id.) Spencer also filed a Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order. (R000 13-00121 .) In the Complaint, the only explanation
provided by Spencer as to the allegedly defamatory nature of the Yelp.com review was:
(i) "Defendant Glover caused to be published and/or remain published a statement in

electronic print on an internet website open to the public defamatory statements
concerning Terry R. Spencer[r (Rooo3, at ,I 11.); and (ii) "Said statement made by
Defendant Glover are (sic) false, without foundation and are (sic) attempts to impeach
the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, (sic) of [Plaintiff] ... and thereby, expose
[Plaintiffs] ... to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule as well as loss of income. (Roooo300004,

at 112 (alterations added).)

At the hearing on the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Judge Hogan
found, among other things, that Spencer did not have a good likelihood of success on the
merits. (R00285-00287.) Judge Hogan based his decision primarily upon the Yelp.com
review amounting to mere opinion. (R00286, at ~ii 15-19.).) Therefore, Judge Hogan
denied Spencer's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (R00283.)
10

On June 29, 2015, Mr. Glover filed pursuant to UTAH R. C1v. P. 12(b)(6) and UTAH
ConEANN. § 78B-11-108 a Motion to Dismiss the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Causes

of Action, and to dismiss and/or stay the remaining breach of contract claim pending
arbitration. (R00221-00272.) 5 On July 13, 2015, Spencer filed an opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss. (R00342-00368.) In support of the opposition, Spencer also
submitted four affidavits the same day. (R00328-0034 l.) Over the next two days,
Spencer also lodged with the Court two more affidavits. (R0037 l-003 78.) Glover filed
his reply in fmiher support of the Motion to Dismiss on July 17, 2015. (R00394-00407.)
Judge Hogan heard oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss on September 3,
2015. (R00461-00512 (Trans.).) Ultimately, Judge Hogan issued a Ruling and Order on

5

Before Mr. Glover filed his Motion to Dismiss, on June 19, 2015, Spencer served three

subpoenas, one each on Mr. Glover's ex-wife, her attorney, and Mr. Glover's employer.
(R00298-00306.) Mr. GJover's response to the Complaint, however, was not yet due and
therefore discovery was not yet open. Therefore, on July 1, 2015, Mr. Glover attempted
to meet-and-confer with Spencer regarding the rogue subpoenas. (R00307-00308.) On
July 6, 2015, Spencer refused to withdraw the subpoenas. (R00315.) Therefore, Mr.
Glover was forced to file a Statement of Discovery Issues with the court below.
(R00291-00295.) Spencer did not oppose the Statement of Discovery Issues. (R0038 I.)
The Court granted the Statement of Discovery Issues, quashed the subpoenas, and stayed
discovery pending the resolution of Mr. Glover's Motion to Dismiss. (R00391-00392.)

II

September 28, 2015 granting the Motion to Dismiss in its entirety. (R004 l 7-00427.) As

to the defamation claim, Judge Hogan applied West and Hogan. In doing so, Judge
Hogan analyzed the following four factors:
(i) the common usage or meaning of the words used; (ii) whether the
statement is capable of being objectively verified as true or false; (iii) the
full context of the statement-Jo,· example, the entire article or column-in
which the defamatory statement is made; and (iv) the broader setting in
which the statement appears."

(Roo421 (citing Hogan, 2012 WL 4356326, at ·*8 (citing West, 872 P.2d at 1018)).)
To the first factor, Judge Hogan found that "the words 'hunt-and-peck', 'b.s.',
'yelled', and 'worst ever' are words commonly used to convey one's subjective belief
about another's ability or behavior." (Id.) He found that "I'd be willing to wager" is
likewise indicative of subjective belief. (Roo421-00422.) To the second factor, Judge
Hogan found that "because the words convey a subjective belief, it is not possible ... to
objectively verify whether the statements are true or false." (Roo422.)
To the third factor, Judge Hogan found that "[t]he context of the Yelp review also
shows that the statements were made by a biased, and therefore potentially unreliable,
individual." (Id.) In reaching that conclusion, Judge Hogan noted that the other
statements in the comment "make clear that the statements are based in opinion, rather
than fact." (Id.) Finally, to the fourth factor, Judge Hogan found that "the broad setting
in which the article appears - a necessarily subjective online review of a particular
business, published in the review section of a website commonly used by customers to
rank their experiences with business of all kinds - suggests that the statements are
opinion." (Id.) As Judge Hogan explained, "[t]he reasonable reader would realize not

12

only that the accusation was made in the heat of a nasty legal dispute but also that the
'objectionable terms were merely hyperbole and rhetorical flourish."' (Id. (citing Hogan
v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1108 (10th Cir. 2014).) Indeed, as Judge Hogan cited,

"during oral argument, even Spencer identified [Mr.] Glover's remarks as 'ranting and
raving' and the 'beliefs' of one individual." (Id. See also Roo482, at 22:8-15.) In short,
Judge Hogan found that "the Yelp review is hyperbolic opinion." (Roo422.)
Because Spencer based their other tort-based claims and declaratory relief on the
alleged defamatory nature of the Yelp.com review, ,Judge Hogan also dismissed those
claims. As to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, Judge Hogan found
that "(w]riting and publishing a critical online review docs not amount to outrageous
and intolerable behavior, particularly where there is no defamation." (Roo423.) As to
the intentional interference with economic relations claim, Judge Hogan found that
"even if [Mr.] Glover intentionally inte1fered ,vith Spencer's prospective economic
relations, and even if such interference resulted in injury to Spencer, the facts alleged in
Spencer's pleading do not demonstrate that writing an online review amounts to an
'improper means'. The court has already determined that the review did not amount to
defamation, and no other impropriety is apparent." (Roo424.) ,Judge Hogan also
dismissed Spencer's claim for declaratory relief (icl.), but Spencer has not appealed that
aspect of the Order. (See generally App. Br.)
Finally, Judge Hogan dismissed without prejudice Spencer's claim for breach of
contract. (R.00425-26.) Like the declaratory relief claim, Spencer has not appealed that
aspect of ,Judge Hogan's Order. (See generally App. Br.) Spencer filed a Notice of
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Appeal on October 23, 2015. (Roo428-00429.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Judge Hogan, through a well-reasoned and thorough order, reached the correct
conclusion. Spencer filed a complaint asserting in conclusory fashion that the Yelp.corn
review was defamatory. While Spencer did not point out which parts of the comment
were defamatory, Judge Hogan engaged in a detailed analysis of the review, going lineby-line over every aspect of the review that could potentially be construed as defamatory.
Judge Hogan also gave proper review to and consideration of the other aspects of the
review, including the nature of Yelp.com and the review when read as a whole. As to
each of the allegedly offending portions of the comment -- portions cited by Spencer here
on appeal - Judge Hogan gave careful consideration of the law and found that the review
was a hyperbolic comment by a disgruntled former client of Spencer's, thereby making
the comment mere opinion and not otherwise actionable statements of fact.
Now with a second chance to explain why the Yelp.com review is defamatory,
Spencer still has failed to do so. A review of the West factors, as applied by the United
States District Court, District of Utah, in Hogan shows the Yelp.com review is not
defamatory. The common usage of the words - including "worst ever", ub.s.", uhuntand-peck", "'yelled", and "I'd be willing to wager" - arc words commonly used to convey
one's subjective belief. Because the words convey subjective belief, it is not possible to
objectively verify the statements, as Judge Hogan found. The full context of the review
militates towards the finding that the review is the mere opinion of a dissatisfied former
14

client, as explained in the review. Finally, the broader setting - a comment on Yelp.com,
a comment aggregator - also leads to the conclusion that the review is mere opinion and
not defamatory as a matter of law.
Because Spence(s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
inlentional interference with economic relations rise and fall with the defamation claim,
which Spencer agrees with, Judge Hogan's order was correct in dismissing those claims
with prejudice as we11. Respectfully~ this Court should affirm Judge Hogan's order in
total.

ARGUMENT
I.

General Law Applicable To Defamation And The First Amendment
While Judge Hogan's order focused on the West and Hogan factors, as discussed

below, it is important to note that Spencer's claims against Mr. Glover implicate a wider
range of law. It bears emphasis that "state defamation law may not permit causes of
action that impair state or federal constitutional freedom of expression or freedom of the
press." Dennet v. Smith, 445 P.2d 983, 1004 (Utah 1968). As with the First
Amendment, the Utah Constitution protects statements of opinion. As the Utah Supreme
Court has stated: "article I, sections I and 15 protect expressions of opinion, and this
protection is 'abused' when the opinion states or implies facts that are false and
defamatory. If the opinion does not imply such facts or if the underlying facts are not
defamatory, an action for defamation is improper." Id. at IO 15.
federal law is in accord. "Although the Supreme Court has refused to give
15

blanket First Amendment protection for opinions, its precedents make clear that the First
Amendment does protect 'statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating
actual facts about an individual."' Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC, 728 F.3d 592, 597 (6 th Cir.
2013) (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990)) (affirming
dismissal of defamation action based upon statement that hotel was amongst the "dirtiest"
hotels). "[T]he Supreme Court [has] reaffirmed ... [the proposition] that ... statements
employing 'loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression
that the writer was seriously maintaining' an assertion of fact[]" are protected speech. Id.
(citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20-21 ).
II.

Judge Hogan Was Correct In Finding The Yelp.com
Review Is Mere Opinion And Not Dcfamatorv

In analyzing Spencer's defamation claim, Judge Hogan correctly cited and applied
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah
1994). (R004 I 9-00420.) As the Supreme Court stated, "[t]o state a claim for
defamation, [plaintiff] must shovv that defendant[] published the statements concerning
[plaintiff], that the statements were false, defamatory, and not subject to any privilege,
that the statements were published with the requisite degree of fault, and that their
publication resulted in damage." West, 872 P.2d at 1008-09. As he was reviewing the
Complaint on a motion to dismiss, Judge Hogan "accept[ed] that the statements were
false and that they resulted in damage to Spencer." (Roo420.)
Therefore, Judge Hogan's review was narrowed down to "'whether the statements
are capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning and whether any qualified or absolute
16

privileges preclude [Spencer's] claim."' (Id. (citing West, 872 P.2d at 1008) (alteration
in original).) While Spencer did not explain in their Complaint what aspects of the
Yelp.com review were allegedly defamatory, 6 Judge Hogan identified "the potentially
objectionable statements[,]" which are:
while he makes me ,vatch [];

2.

"1.

'all for his hunt-and-peck filing typing b.s.

'I'd be willing to wager that he was sitting on it and

running the bill up until I produced money[]; and :3. 'Yelled at me once when I called to
ask him about something his office had sent me that day. Told me to 'GOOGLE IT!'
Worst. Ever." (Roo421 (citing R.000010).)

Judge Hogan then proceeded to determine whether those statements amounted to
defamation. As Judge Hogan cited, "to determine whether a statement is fact or opinion,
the Court considers the following four factors:
(i) the common usage or meaning of the words used; (ii) whether the
statement is capable of being objectively verified as true or false; (iii) the
full context of the stlltement-for example, the entire article or column-in
which the defamatory statement is made; and (iv) the broader setting in
which the statement appears.

6

Spencer bore the burden of explaining in their Complaint which aspects of the

Yelp.com review were alleged Iy defamatory. "It is almost axiomatic that in defamation

cases a certain degree of specificity is an essential in pleadings, that the language
complained of must be set forth in words or words to that effect and that the defendant
should not be required to resort to the ofttimes expensive discovery process to drag from
a litigant what he really intends to do to his adversary by a vehicle shrouded in mystery."

Dennet, 445 P .2d at 984.
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(Roo42l (citing Hogan, 2012 WL 4356326, at *8 (citing West, 872 P.2d at 1018)).)

Judge Hogan then proceed to analyze each of the Hpotenlially objectionable
statements" under the Hogan and West framework. As Judge Hogan cotTectly found,
each of the four factors show that the Yelp.com review is opinion, does not include
statements of fact, and therefore does not amount to defamation as a matter of law.

A. The Common Usage Of The Words In The
Yelp.com Review Is To Express Opinion
"Whether a statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning is a
question oflaw[.]" West, 872 P.2cl at 1008 (citations omitted). "'[I]n determining
whether a particular statement fits within the rather broad definition of what may be
considered defamatory, the guiding principle is the statement's tendency to injure a
reputation in the eyes of its audience."' Hogan,

2012

WL 4356326, at *7 (citing West,

872 P.2d at 1008) (alteration in original). That being said, "'[b]ecause expressions of
pure opinion fuel the marketplace of ideas and because such expressions are incapable
of being verified, they cannot serve as the basis for defamation liability."' Id. (citing

West, 872 P.2d at 1015) (alteration in original).
As Judge Hogan found, "the words 'hunt-and-peck', 'b.s.', 'yelled', and 'worst
ever' are words commonly used to convey one's subjective belief about another's ability
or behavior." (R00421.) And this finding is correct. The common usage of these words
are "used to convey one's subjective belief about another's ability or behavior." Hogan,
2012 WL 4356326, at *8 ("performance" and "erratic" are statements of opinion). See

also West, 872 P.2d at I 008-09 (while "statement [of manipulation] is critical of West,
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we do not believe it rises to the level of defamation."); Brampton Bldg, LLC, 2013 IL
App (JS') 120547-U, 2013 WL 416185, at *7 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 31, 2013) (unpublished)
("This is a TOT AL lie!!!" and statements of "illegally charging late fees" arc statements
of opinion based on, among other things, context). Moreover, with the statements being
in a Y clp.com review, the context also shows that the comments are opinion. Hogan,
2012 WL 4356326, at *8; West, 872 P.2d at 1009; Brompton Bldg., LLC, 2013 WL
416185, at *7. Indeed, like the editorial in West, the comments here were "made in a
casual, albeit critical, tone.'' 872 P.2d at IO I 0. And, as the West court found, "[i]t is
unlikely that any reader would take lthe commcntsJ at face value; instead, most readers
would view [the comments] as exaggerated commentary expressing [Mr. Glover's]
frustration in dealing with [Spencer]." Id.
Spencer does not directly refute that the common usage of "hunt-and-peck",
"b.s.", and "yelled" convey subjective belief. (See App. Br. at I 7-18.) Spencer,
however, claims that the statement "worse ever" is "clearly false and defamatory[.]" (Id.
at 18.) Spencer, however, docs not explain how "'worse ever" or "worst ever" - both
superlatives - in their common usage are anything other than hyperbole and one's
subjective belief. Likewise, while Spencer takes issue with the statement "had to fire
him" and "I gave him a chance for well over a year" (id at 18.), Spencer fails to explain
how these words do not convey anything but Mr. Glover's subjective belief or
interpretation of what happened. Indeed, Spencer says that Mr. Glover used these words
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to "suggest" or "give the clear impression", both of which show that even in Spencer's
mind, the words convey Mr. Glover's subjective belief. See Seaton, 728 F.3d at 598
(affirming dismissal of defamation claim because, among other things, 'HDirtiest' is a
loose, hyperbolic term because it is the superlative of an adjective that conveys an
inherently su/~jective concept'' (emphasis added)).

B. The Potentially Obiectionable Statements Are
Not Capable Of Being Obiectivcly Verified
To the second West/Hogan factor, Judge Hogan found that "because the words
convey a subjective belief, it is not possible ... to objectively verify whether the
statements are true or false." (R.00422.) This is the exact language from the Hogan
opinion. See lfogan, 2012 WL 4356356, at *8. Moreover, as Mr. Glover explained in
his reply in further support of his Motion to Dismiss, as a matter of logic, how would one
prove that a lawyer is the "Worst. Ever."? Such a statement is unquantifiable and
unprovable. One would theoretically have to poll a large sample of Salt Lake or Utah,

and ask those individuals questions about the thousands of attorneys here to try to
determine who is the worst. 7 More importantly, the polling would necessarily have to ask
'"what is your opinion as to attorney X?" in order to determine who is Hworst." See
Seaton, 728 F.3d at 598.

7

And might even have to include retired, disbarred, and deceased attorneys to cover the

"Ever" aspect of the comment.
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~.

A similar analysis applies to "had to fire him" and "I gave him a chance for well
over a year." Utah law is clear that it is solely the client's prerogative as to whether keep
or terminate an attorney/client relationship. "A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at
any time, with or without cause[.]" UTAH. R. PROF'L C. 1.16, comment 4 (emphasis
added). If the client feels that he gave his attorney "'well over a year" lo prove himself
and the client is dissatisfied, then it is solely the cl ie::nt 's decision as to whether he "had to
fire" his attorney or not. Put simply, and as supported by the Rules of Professional
Conduct, that decision is solely the subjective choice of the client.
Spencer claims that because he has never been disciplined by the Utah State Bar
and that he has over 25 years of experience, he simply cannot be the "worst ever"
attorney in Utah. (App. Br. at 18, n.4.)8 The argument misses the mark. The superlative
8

While Spencer cites never having been sanctioned by the Utah State Bar, the

Professional Conduct Board of the Idaho State Bar issued a public reprimand against
Terry R. Spencer based on professional misconduct. See The Advocate, Official
Publication of the Idaho State Bar, Vo. 52 No. I, Jan. 2009, at 10 (available at
http://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/advocatc/issucs/adv09jan.pdf (last visited June 2, 2016)).
Furthermore, there is at least one case where Spencer was sanctioned by a court. See Seal
v. Young, No. 2: 10-cv-790 TS, 2012 WL 177544 (D. Utah Jan. 20, 2012) (unpublished)

("ORDERED that Plaintiffs counsel, Terry R. Spencer, shall pay attorney fees, in the
amount of six thousand, one hundred and twenty dollars ($6,120.00), to Defendants.").
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nature of ''worst ever", akin to the superlative "dirtiest'\ is one~s own subjective belief.
See Seaton, 728 F.3d at 598. Again, one would be hard-pressed to come up with a

workable metric by which to objectively determine who is, in fact, the worst attorney in
Utah.
Likewise, Spencer asserts that "yelled at me" is somehow subject to objective
verification. (App. Br. at 19.) The statement is illogical and cannot withstand scrutiny.
A high-pitched shrill may be entirely unobjectionable to a person with diminished
hearing, while a church mouse's footsteps could be uncomfortable to someone with
supersonic hearing. In other words, whether a person's communication amounts to
"yelling" is simply in the ear of the listener. Finally, Spencer submits that "astronomical
arrearage" is also subject to objective verification. (App. 13r. at 19.) Like Spencer's
others arguments, this assertion proverbially falls a few dollars short. The deepest
pockets in the world - such as Warren Buffet - may find that Mr. Glover's arrearage
balance amounted to mere pennies in the grand scheme. But someone living at or near
the poverty line would be crushed by even a few hundred dollars in arrearagcs. Whether
an arrearage amount is ''astronomical" depends upon the balance sheet of the debtor. 9
C. The Full Yelp.com Review Shows That It Is Mere Opinion

As Judge Hogan explained, ··[t]he context of the Yelp review also shows that the
9

Spencer does not challenge that "hunt-and-peck" and "running up the bill" are not

subject to objective verification. (App. Br. at 19.)
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statements were made by a biased, and therefore potentially unreliable, individual."
(R00422.) In reviewing the Yelp.com review in its entirety, Judge Hogan high Iighted
that "[t]he review communicates that [Mr.] Glover was in the midst of an acrimonious
divorce, that he had fired Spencer, that he sti1I owed Spencer several thousand dollars,
that [Mr.] Glover faced ·astronomical' support arrears, and that the Office of Recovery
Services was threatening to take Glover's 'license and passport."' (Id.) In reviewing the
entirety of the Yelp.com review, Judge Hogan found that "it appears clear that the context

of the statements, that is, the full review, makes clear that the statements are based in
opinion, rather than fact." (/d.) Judge Hogan was correct.
Aside from what Judge Hogan highlighted, other portions of the Yelp.com review
show that Mr. Glover was expressing his opinion. For example, ''I'd be willing to wager"
evidences a former client expressing his opinion and dissatisfaction with his former
attorney. Bro mp ton Bldg, LLC, 2013 WL 416185, at 'l."7 (While "rhetorical hyperbole ...
[in] a review on a website where people search for information regarding local
business ... appears to signal factual content[,] ... review[ing] [the comment] in its
entirety [appears to show it is] in the nature of opinions, not statements of fact."). See

also Hogan, 2012 WL 4356326, at •x•s; West, 872 P .2d at 1009.
Spencer asserts that Judge Hogan "improperly took ... these additional facts"
highlighted by Judge Hogan - which Spencer calls "mental-health-related facts or
claims" - into consideration. (App. Br. at 20.) But Spencer's argument is based upon a
misunderstanding of the West/ Hogan third factor. The question is whether the entirety
of the comment suggests that the speaker is conveying facts or whether the speaker is

_.,

') .....

conveying mere opinion. Therefore, Judge Hogan properly and correctly considered the
Yelp.com review in its entirety when reaching his decision.
While Spencer's argument misses the mark in regards to the third factor, it bears
emphasis that Spencer's entire argument as to the third factor is based upon Spencer
challenging his former client's mental state. Spencer states that Mr. Glover has
"questionable mental health", that Mr. Glover has a "diminished state of mind", and that

Mr. Glover is "mentally ill." (App. Br. at

20-21,

23.) Mr. Glover takes issue with

Spencer's characterization. While Spencer and Mr. Glover are engaged in litigation
related to Spencer's representation of Mr. Glover, the simple fact is that Spencer is still,
nonetheless, Mr. Glover's former attorney. Regardless of how upset an attorney is with a

fom1er client, an attorney should not characterize -- before a court of this state or
othe1wisc - his former client as having mental health issues unless the issue is relevant,
such as in competency proceedings during criminal cases. Ironically, Sptmcer stating in
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his brief that Mr. Glover is 111Cntally il1" is itself potentially defamatory.
D. rfhe Broader Setting Of The Review Published On
Yelp.com Shows The Review Is Mere Opinion

Finally, Judge Hogan properly concluded that "the broader setting in which the
article appears - a necessarily subjective online revit!w of a particular business, published
in the review section of a website commonly used by customers to rank their experiences
with businesses of all kinds - suggests that the statements are opinion." (R00422.) As

Judge Hogan explained, "[t]he reasonable reader would realize not only that the
accusation was made in the heat of a nasty legal dispute but also that 'the objectionable
24

terms were merely hyperbole and rhetorical flourish.'" (Id. (citing Hogan v. Winder, 762
F.3d at 1108.)

As Mr. Glover explained in the court below, West is instructive on this point.
There, the court stressed that the allegedly defamatory comment was "in a newspaper
editorial, a traditional source of harsh political invective." West, 872 P.2d at 1009.
Here, the comments were on Yelp.com, an online aggregalor of public comments about
local establishments. If a person gives a "one star" review, accompanied by a negative
comment, like the readers of a newspaper editorial column, the readers of those
comments are "less likely to form personal animus toward an individual based on
statements made in" the Yelp.com reviews section. Id. at

1010.

To this point, during oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss, Judge Hogan
asked Spencer "that if [someone] posted a 1 star or a 1 on a scale of 1 to 10 or a o and
nothing further ... under the position you've advocated, that's actionable defamation."
(Roo491, at 31:8-16.) Spencer responded that it would not be defamation "because how

do you prove a star is true or false?" (Id. at 31:20-23.) Spencer's concession should
resolve this dispute. Be it a star or a comment with superlatives and hyperbolic
language, the conclusion reached from Judge Hogan's rationale - and Spencer's
concession thereto - is the same. The overall context of the Yelp.com review at issue
here suggests that the comment is opinion: akin to a 1-star rating. See Loftus v. Nazar(
21

F.Supp.3d 849, 854 (E.D. Ky. 2014) ("Further, it must be taken into account that the

statements by Ms. Nazari were posted on opinion websites; therefore, the natural
tendency would be to infer that they are opinion.").
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Spencer's only argument in regards to the fourth West/ Hogan factor is that "the
comment should be seen through the eyes of those who read the comment, not the
person who authored the comment." (App. Br. at 22.) A review of Judge Hogan's order,
however, shows that is exactly what Judge Hogan did. And Spencer's own argument noting that Mr. Glover's remarks were "ranting and raving'' and the "beliefs" of one
individual - shows that even Spencer, a reader himself of the Yelp.com review, saw the
comment as mere opinion. (See Roo436.)

Overall, Judge Hogan was correct in noting "that any review which is either
emphatically positive or emphatically negative is hyperbole.'' (R00422.) Therefore, Mr.
Glover respectfully submits that this Court should affirm Judge Hogan's order dismissing
Spencer's defamation claim with prejudice.

III.

The Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress Claim Fails Because
The Yelp.com Review \Vas Not Defamatory And Otherwise Does Not
Rise To The Level Of Extreme Or Outrageous Conduct
Judge Hogan properly found that"[ w ]riting and publishing a critical on line review

does not amount to outrageous and intolerable behavior, particularly where there is no
defamation." (R.00437.) Spencer's only argument in response is lo double-down on his
assertion that the Yelp.com review was defamatory. (App. Br. at 25.) Therefore, if this
Court affirms Judge Hogan's order as to the defamation claim, it must therefore affirm
the order as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim as well.
Even if the review was defamatory - which, as Judge Hogan found and as detailed
above, it was not - the mere posting or a review on Yelp.com cannot be said lo be
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"outrageous and intolerable in that [it] offend[s] against the generally accepted standards
of decency and morality." Bennet, 2003 UT 9,

,1 58.

Indeed, aside from the allegedly

defamatory nature of the review, Spencer provides no explanation in his Complaint or his
brief as to how Mr. Glover's conduct was outrageous or intolerable. (See generally

R0000l-R0O0l 0; App. Br. at 23-25.)
IV.

The Intentional .Interference With Economic Relations
Claim Fails Because Mr. Glover's Yelp.com Review
Docs Not Amount To Improper Means
Judge Hogan also properly dismissed the intentional interference with economic

relations claim. As Judge Hogan explained, in applying Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT

21, 345 P.3d 553, "even if [Mr.] glover intentionally interfered with Spencer's
prospective economic relations, and even if such interference resulted in injury to

Spencer, the facts alleged in Spencer's pleading do not demonstrate that writing an online
review amounts to an 'improper means'." (R00438.) See Loftus,

21

F.Supp.3d at 854

("where an action for interference with prospective business relationship relies on a
defamatory posting as the instrument of such interference, the prospective relationship
count fails if the posting was protected opinion" (citation omitted).)
Spencer's only argument is again to reassert that the Yelp.com review was
defamatory, and therefore the intentional interference claim should not have been
dismissed. (App. Br. 26.) As Judge Hogan noted, "no other impropriety is apparent" in
Spencer's Complaint. (Roo438.) Because the Yelp.com review is not defamatory,
Spencer's claim for intentional interference with economic relations necessarily fails as
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well.
V.

Judge Hogan Properly Treated Mr. Glover's
Motion As A Motion To Dismiss

Spencer did not directly raise the issue of Judge Hogan's decision to not consider
the affidavits submitted by Spencer with their opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. (See
App. Br. 1-2.) Therefore, Spencer has not properly preserved the issue on appeal. See,
e.g., Allen, 2008 UT at 1 8. Spencer, however, references the six affidavits he filed with

the cou1i below. (See App. Br. at 12-13, ~132-34.) Spencer also relics upon the
affidavits in addressing the "full context" prong of the West/Hogan analysis. (See App.
Br. at 21, 1 16.) Therefore, out of an abundance of caution and in order to be thorough,
Mr. Glover is addressing Judge Hogan's decision to not consider the affidavits filed by
Spencer.
"If a court docs not exclude material outside the pleadings and fails to convert a

rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment, it is reversible error unless the
dismissal can be justified without considering the outside documents." Oakwood Village,
LLC, 2004 UT IO 1, 1 12 ( citation omitted). There are two exceptions, however. "First, if
'a plaintiff does not incorporate by reference or attach a document to its complaint, but

the document is referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff's claim, a
defendant may submit an indisputably authentic copy to the court to be considered on a
motion to dismiss.'" Id. at 1 13 ( citation omitted). Second, "the submission of
documents outside the pleadings by itself is not a basis for conversion to summary
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judgment; to effect a rule l 2(b) conversion, the court must have relied on those
documents for its decision." Id. at il 14 (citation omitted).
In their brief, Spencer docs no articulate their position as to why Judge Hogan
should have considered the affidavits filed in support of their opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss. In the court below, however, Spencer argued that because Mr. Glover
submitted certain documents to the court, "this matter is to be treated ... as a 'Motion for
Summary Judgment' and will be treated as such by Plaintiffs[.]" (R00343.) Spencer's
argument below was wrong. The documents submitted by Mr. Glover were: (i) the
engagement letter entered into between Spencer and Mr. Glover (R00264-00270); (ii) a
scrcenshot from Spencer's onlinc blog (R0024 I -0025 I); and (iii) a copy of the docket
from Mr. Glover's divorce case (R00253-00259). As to the online blog, Mr. Glover
specifically stated that he was not requesting that the court take judicial notice of the
blog; he was "merely providing th[ e] information as background." (R00225.) As to the
other documents, Mr. Glover requested that the court take judicial notice of those
documents. (See R00227.)
Judge Hogan did not con.sider any evidence outside of the pleadings when
rendering his decision on the Molion to Dismiss, .save for the engagement letter entered
into by Spencer and Mr. Glover and the Yelp.com review at issue. (R00433.) As to the
review, Judge I Iogan properly found that Spencer had "attached a copy of the relevant
publication to his complaint[.]" subjecting the Yelp.com review to consideration on a
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motion to dismiss. (Id. (citing Oakwood Vil!. LLC, 2004 UT J 01, if I 3).) As to the
engagement letter, .Judge Hogan found that Mr. ''Glover ... submitted an indisputably
authentic copy of that document to be considered on the motion to dismiss." (Id.)
Because Spencer based their breach of contract claim on the engagement letter, the
engagement letter was properly the subject of judicial notice. Alvarado v. KOBTV, LLC,
493 F.3d 1210, 1215 ( I 0th Cir. 2007) ("[N]otwithstanding the usual rule that a court
should consider no evidence beyond the pleadings on a Rule l 2(b )( 6) motion to dismiss,
' [a] district court may consider documents referred to in the complaint if the documents
are central to the plaintiffs claim and the parties do not dispute the documents'
authenticity."'); see also GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d
1381, 1385 (10th Cir. 1997) (same). 10 Importantly, Judge Hogan then stated that "[a]ll
other proffered matters outside the pleadings are hereby excluded by the court pursuant to
UTAH R. Clv. P. I 2(b)."

VI.

Request To Seal Portions Of The Record On Appeal

In support of their Motion for Temporary Restraining Order filed in the court
below, Spencer included several attorney/client communications. (See R00026; R00028;
R00030; R00041; R00045; R00047~ R00050; R00052; R00060; R00075; R00079-0008 l;
10

Dahl v. Harrison, 2011 UT App 389, ii 34 n.11, 265 P.3d 139 C"'[t]o the extent Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure arc similarly worded to the Federal Rules, federal rules and
cases may be used to interpret them."' (citation omitted; alteration in original)).
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R00085-00089; R00093-00097; R00I00; R00108.) In the Court below, Mr. Glover
requested that the case record be scaled as to prevent further dissemination of these
potentially protected and confidential records. (See Addendum, at ROOS I 6.) Spencer
would not stipulate, and filed a "Notice of Lodging" which included documents upon
which Spencer apparently rclic<l in submilling the attorney/client communications in the
open record. (See R00 164-00177.) Spencer claimed that even if the attorney takes the
offensive and files a lawsuit against his client, "the attorney-client privilege is implicitly
waived if the attorney needs to defend him or herself." (R00500, at 40:6-9.)
Over Spencer's objection, Judge Hogan ordered the record sealed based upon
Spencer's submission of the potentially protectable, rnnfidential communications. (See
Addendum, at ROOS 16.) Now, further compounding the issue, Spencer has filed the
appellate record before this Court not under seal. Therefore, Mr. Glover respectfully
requests that the Court seal the following portions of the record: R00026; R00028;
R00030; R0004 l; R00045; R00047; R00050; R00052; R00060; R00075; R00079-0008 l;
R00085-00089; R00093-00097; R00I00; R00I08. See UTAH R. APP. P. 21(g); UTAH
CODE JUD. ADMIN.

R. 4-202.02(3 )(I). Specifically, Mr. Glover does not want the entire

case scaled. This case is of public importance. But the attorney/client communications
should not be available to the public.
CONCLUSION

In a detailed order, Judge Hogan properly and correctly analyzed Mr. Glover's
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Yelp.com review and found thal the review did nol amount to defamation. Spencer's
arguments on appeal give no reason to disagree with Judge Hogan's well-reasoned order.
The simple fact is that the Yelp.com review is hyperbole, laced with superlatives, and
amounts to nothing more than opinion. The freedom of expression is a bedrock principle
in the state of Utah and the nation as a whole. Allowing an attorney to sue his former
client based purely on a negative online review wherein the client expresses his opinion
as to the attorney would unduly chill the freedom of expression. More importantly, the
free exchange of information online, including former clients' opinions, assists
individuals when selecting an attorney to represent them. Judge Hogan's order was
c01Tect. And Mr. Glover respectfully submits that this Court should affirm the order in

total.
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(l1) STATEMENT

Included herewith is a copy of the docket from the trial court below. The
numbering continues the Court's numbering of the record on appeal. Specifically, the
docket bears the record numbers R.00513-00521.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO UTAH R. APP. P. 24(t)(l)(A)

By signing below, the signor certifies that Defendant/Appellee Stephen M.
Glover's opposition brief complies with

UTAH

R. APP. P. 24(t)( I )(A). The typeface is

13-point font, Times New Roman. The Microsoft Word "word count" tool indicates that
the brief has 687 lincs comprised of8,428 words, inclusive of the
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UTAH

R. APP. P.

@

24(a)(l 1) and 24(f)(l)(A) compliance statements.

DA TED this 8th day of June, 2016.
THE SALT LAKE LAWYERS
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IN THE. UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
---0000000---

TERRY R. SPENCER, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appel ]ants,

V.

STEPHEN M. GLOVER,
Defcndant/ Appel Ice.

)
)
)

)
) Appellate Case No. 20150892-CA
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLEE - ADDENDUM
Appeal from Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, !:,..pencer, et al., v. Glover, Case No.
150903279, Honorable L. Douglas Hogan, Presiding

ROBERT 8. CUMMINGS (SBN 13186)
THE SALT LAKE LA WYERS
IO Exchange Place, Suite 622
Salt Lake City, UT 8411 I
Telephone: (801) 590-7555
Facsimile: (801) 384-0825
E-mai I: ,r~JJ.?crt«i~thcsal tlakelawycrs.com
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee

GA VIN G. COLLIER
TERRY R. SPENCER, Ph.D.
TR Spencer & Associates, P.C.

140 West 9000 South, Suite 9
Sandy, Utah 84070
Attorneys.fiJr Plaintiff/Appellant

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
APPEALED: CASE #20150892
TERRY R SPENCER vs. STEPHEN M GLOVER
CASE NUMBER 150903279 Miscellaneous

@

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
L DOUGLAS HOGAN
PARTIES

®

@

Plaintiff - TERRY R SPENCER
Represented by: GAVIN V COLLIER
Plaintiff - TR SPENCER & ASSOCIATES PC
Represented by: GAVIN V COLLIER
Defendant - STEPHEN M GLOVER
Represented by: ROBERT B CUMMINGS
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

@

i)

i)

i)

Amount Due:
597.66
Amount Paid:
597.66
Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT - NO AMT s
Amount Due:
360.00
Amount Paid:
360.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY

Amount Due:
10.00
Amount Paid:
10.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-COPIES
Amount Due:
2.66
Amount Paid:
2.66
Amount Credit:
0.00
Ba.lance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL
Amount Due:
225.00
Amount Paid:
225.00
Printed: 06/06/16 16:10:37
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CASE NUMBER 150903279 Miscellaneous
Amount Credit:
Balance:

0.00
0.00

PROCEEDINGS
05-15-15 Filed: Complaint
05-15-15 Case filed
05-15-15 Fee Account created
Total Due:
360.00
05-15-15 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
Payment Received:
360.00
05-15-15 Judge L DOUGLAS HOGAN assigned.
05-15-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
05-15-15 Filed: Motion for Temporary Order Restrainting Order Pending
Hearing
Filed by: TR SPENCER & ASSOCIATES PC,
05-15-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
05-15-15 Filed: Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs Motion For Temporary
Restraining Order Pending Hearing
05-15-15 Filed: Affidavit/Declaration In Support of Temporary
Restraining Order
05-15-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-01-15 Filed: Notice to Submit
06-01-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-02-15 Filed: Order (Proposed) Granting Temporary Restraining Order
06-02-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-02-15 Filed: Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures
06-02-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-02-15 Note: JA contacted Mr. Collier's office to provide court date
and instructed legal assistanct that Mr. Collier is to
notify opposing party of the court date.
06-02-15 TEMP RESTRAIN ORDER scheduled on June 08, 2015 at 03:00 PM in
WJ Courtroom 31 with Judge HOGAN.
06-03-15 Filed: Notice of Hearing
06-03-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-04-15 Filed return: Return of Service upon STEPHEN M. GLOVER for
Party Served: STEPHEN M GLOVER
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: May 27, 2015
06-04-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-08-15 Minute Entry - Minutes for Temp Restrain Order
Judge:
L DOUGLAS HOGAN
Printed: 06/06/16 16:10:37
Page 2
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CASE NUMBER 150903279 Miscellaneous
@

06-16-15 Filed: Other - Declined to Sign Order (Proposed) Granting
06-16-15
06-17-15

(!)

06-17-15
06-17-15
06-17-15
06-19-15
06-19-15

@

06-19-15
06-19-15
06-25-15
06-25-15
06-26-15

@)
06-26-15
06-26-15
06-29-15
06-29-15
06-29-15
06-29-15

@

06-29-15

06-29-15

06-29-15
06-29-15

@

Temporary Restraining Order
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Notice of Intent To Seek Records
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Notice of Lodging - Rule 510
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Subpoena Duces Tecum (Records Only)
Filed: Subpoena Duces Tecum (Records Only)
Filed: Subpoena Duces Tecum (Records Only)
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Request/Notice to Submit ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS EX
PARTE MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Filed: Order (Proposed) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS EX PARTE
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Note: Submitted Efiled Order to Judge
Filed: Objection to Notice To Submit
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed return: Return of Service upon COURTNEY RECORD for
Party Served: STEPHEN M GLOVER
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: June 22, 2015
Filed return: Return of Service upon MELISSA DIXON for
Party Served: STEPHEN M GLOVER
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: June 22, 2015
Filed return: Return of Service upon MELISSA DIXON for
Party Served: STEPHEN M GLOVER
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: June 22, 2015
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Motion DEFENDANT STEPHEN M. GLOVERS MOTION TO: 1)
DISMISS THE FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION;
AND 2) TO DISMISS AND/OR STAY THE REMAINING CLAIMS PENDING
ARBITRATION OF THE FIFTH COA
Filed by: GLOVER, STEPHEN M

Printed: 06/06/16 16:10:37
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CASE NUMBER 150903?79 Miscellaneous
06-29-15 Filed: Affidavit/Declaration of Stephen M. Glover ISO Motion to

Dismiss/Stay
06-29-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-29-15 Filed: Opposition to ObjecL.i.on to Notice to Submit
06-29-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
07-02-15 Fee Account created

Total Due:

10.00

07-02-15 Fee Account created

Tolal Due:

2.66

07-02-15 AUDIO TAPE COPY

Payment Received:

10.00

07-02-15 POSTAGE-COPIES

Payment Received:

2.66

07-02-15 Filed: Request for Recording - Robert B. Cummings
07-02-15 Note: Requested CD completed and placed in the mail.
07-06-15 Filed order: ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS EX PARTE MOTION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Judge L DOUGLAS HOGAN
Signed July 0 6, 2015
07-06-JS Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
07-07-15 Filed: Statement of Discovery Issues Pursuant to Rule 37(a)
07-07-15 Filed: Statement of Discovery Issues Exhibit l\
07-07-15 Filed: Statement of Discovery Issues Exhibit B
07-0'/-15 Filed: Statement of Discovery Issues Exhibit C

07-07-15 Filed: Statement of Discovery Issues I::xhibit
07-07-15 Filed: Statement

o:

L)

Discovery Issues Exhibit E

07-07-15 Filed: Statement of Discovery Issues Exhibit F
07-07-15 Filed: Statement of Discovery Issues Exhibit G
07-07-15 Filed: Order

(Proposed) Quashing Subpoenas and Staying

Discovery Pending Resolution of Defendants Motion to Dismiss
07-07-15 Filed: Return of ElecLronic Notification
07-08-15 Filed: Other - Declined to Sign Order

(Proposed} Quashing

Subpoenas and Staying Discovery Pending Resolution of
Defendants Motion to Dismiss
07-08-15 Note: A Request to Submit is required according to Rule 7

(civil) or Rule 26 (criminal). Court will not hold
Proposed Orders. Please refile order.
07-08-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
07-13-15 Filed: Affidavit/Declaration of Phil Willson

Defendant GJovers Motion

F'or Surr.mary

(In Opposition to

Judgment}

07-13-15 Filed: Affidav:i.t/Declarat.i.on Of Jeff Rifleman, Esq.

(In

Opposition Lo Defendant Glovers Motion for Summary Judgment)
07-13-15 Filed: Affidavit/Declaration of Ryan Mills

Printed: 06/06/16 16:10:37
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CASE NUMBER 150903279 Miscellaneous
@

07-13-15
07-13-15

@

07-13-15
07-13-15
07-14-15

@

07-14-15
07-15-15
07-15-15
07-16-15

@

07-16-15
07-16-15
07-16-15
@

07-16-15
07-17-15

07-17-15

@

@)

@

07-17-15

07-17-15
07-20-15
08-06-15
08-06-15
08-07-15
08-14-15
Printed:

Defendant Glovers Motion for Summary Judgment)
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Affidavit/Declaration of Terry R. Spencer (In opposition
to Defendant Glovers motion for summary judgment}
Filed: Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Defendant Rule 12(b} (6} Motion to Dismiss
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Affidavit/Declaration of Randy Harrison (In opposition
to Defendant Glovers motion for summary judgment)
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Affidavit/Declaration of Dan Thomas (in opposition to
Defendant Glovers Motion for Summary Judgment)
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed: Request/Notice to Submit Stephen Glovers Rule 37(a)
Statement of Discovery Issues
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Note: NTS placed in Judge's box for review
Filed: Order (Proposed) ORDER QUASHING SUBPOENAS AND STAYING
DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Filed order: ORDER QUASHING SUBPOENAS AND STAYING DISCOVERY
PENDING RESOLUTION OF DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS
Judge L DOUGLAS HOGAN
Signed July 17, 2015
Filed: Reply IFSO DEFENDANT STEPHEN M. GLOVERS MOTION TO: 1)
DISMISS THE FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION;
AND 2) TO DISMISS AND/OR STAY THE REMAINING CLAIMS PENDING
ARBITRATION OF THE FIFTH COA
Filed: Request/Notice to Submit DEFENDANT STEPHEN M. GLOVERS
MOTION TO: 1) DISMISS THE FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, AND FOURTH
CAUSES OF ACTION; AND 2) TO DISMISS AND/OR STAY THE REMAINING
CLAIMS PENDING ARBITRATION OF THE FIFTH COA
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Note: NTS on Mot to Dismiss placed in Judge's box for review
Filed: Notice to Submit (And Request for Hearing)
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
Note: Submitted Notice to Submit & Request for Hearing to
Judge's Team
1 HR MOTION HEARING scheduled on September 03, 2015 at 09:00 AM
06/06/16 16:10:38
Page 7
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CASE NUMBER 150903279 Miscellaneous
in WJ Courtroom 31 with Judge HOGAN.
08-14-15 Notice - NOTICE for Case 150903279 ID 16870027
1 HR MOTION HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 09/03/2015
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 31
8080 South Redwood Road
Suite 1701
West Jordan, UT

84088

Before Judge: L DOUGLAS HOGAN
08-14-15 Filed: Notice for Case 150903279 ID 16870027
09-03-15 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION HEARING
Judge:
Clerk:

L DOUGLAS HOGAN
salomet

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): TERRY R SPENCER
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBERT B CUMMINGS
Audio

Counsel present before the court for this Motion Hearing.
09:17

Robert Cummings argued the Motion to dismiss.

09: 29

Terry Spencer argued before the court.

10:02

Robert Cummings response.

The Court will take this matter under advisement at this time.
end time 10:09

09-28-15 Filed order: Ruling and Order; Deft's Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED; P's tor claims are dismissed w/prejudice; Parties are
ordered to arbitration regarding P's claim for breach of
contract & claim is dismissed w/o prejudice
Judge L DOUGLAS HOGAN
Printed: 06/06/16 16:10:38
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CASE NUMBER 150903279 Miscellaneous
Signed September 28, 2015
09-28-15 Case Disposition is Dismsd w/o prejudice
Disposition Judge is L DOUGLAS HOGAN
10-23-15 Filed: Notice of Appeal - Civil
10-23-15 Fee Account created

(not Interlocutory)

Total Due:

10-23-15 APPEAL

225.00

Payment Received:

2?5.00

10-23-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
10-27-15 Filed: Notice of Transcript Request
10-27-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification

@

10-28-15 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah Letter dated 10-28-2015 to Counsel
-

(Appeal filed - Case 4t20150892 should be indicated on future

filings - rules-info etal)
10-28-15 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah Order dated 10-28-2015 -

(Pursuant

to rule 42(a) AND Checklist for Appellate Jurisdiction)

@

10-28-15 Filed: Notice of Appeal Bond Posting
10-28-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
11-16-15 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals Letter dated 11-16-2015 to Counsel
-

(Case assigned to COA - Case# remain the same)

12-15-15 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 09-03-2015
12-18-15 Filed: Received Transcript of Motion to Dismiss dated 9/3/2015
03-30-16 Note: Appealed: Case #20150892
03-30-16 Filed: Clerk's Certificate (Judgment Roll & Index)
03-30-16 Note: File and transcript uploaded electronically to COA @

Exhibits - 0,

ca

@

Printed: 06/06/16 16:10:38
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRlEF OF
APPELLEE was filed with the Court of Appeals via personal filing. I further certify that
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent via U.S. Mail to:
GAVIN G. COLLIER
TERRY R. SPENCER, Ph.D.
T.R. Spencer & Associates
140 West 9000 South, Ste. 9
Sandy, U~h 84070

DATED this 8th day of June, 2016

THE SALT LAKE LA WYERS

Robert B. Cummings

